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Abstract
We study the consequences of non-neutrality of government debt
with respect to aggregate demand for short-run macroeconomic
stability and for ﬁscal-monetary policy interactions in an environ-
ment where prices are sticky. Assuming either transaction services
of government bonds or partial debt repayments, Ricardian equiv-
alence fails because public debt has a negative impact on its total
rate of return and thus on private savings. Equilibrium stability
then requires real public debt to be stationary, which steers future
expectations about prices and output, and rules out self-fulﬁlling
expectations. Under aggressive anti-inﬂationary monetary policy
regimes, macroeconomic ﬂuctuations can then decrease with the
share of tax ﬁnancing. In particular, a balanced budget policy sta-
bilizes the economy under cost-push shocks such that output and
inﬂation variances can be lower than in a corresponding framework
where debt is neutral.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, E63, E52.
Keywords: Government debt, ﬁscal and monetary policy rules,
stabilization policy, equilibrium uniqueness.
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This paper studies the role of public debt and ﬁscal-monetary policy interactions for
macroeconomic stability in models where the stock of outstanding government bonds is
non-neutral with respect to aggregate demand. Contemporary public policy debates in Eu-
rope show a large and growing concern about macroeconomic implications of government
deﬁcits. How seriously the issues related to government indebtedness are taken can be
seen from recent discussions surrounding the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’, which intends
to restrict ﬁscal deﬁcits on EMU member countries in order to ensure the independence
of the European Central Bank. At the same time, large parts of the recent academic liter-
ature on business cycle theory have concentrated their eﬀorts on the design and analysis
of monetary stabilization policies (see Woodford, 2003), while ﬁscal policies have received
comparatively little attention. The majority of this reseach studies short-run stabiliza-
tion policy in inﬁnite horizon representative agent models with lump-sum taxation, as is
true of most New Keynesian sticky price theories (e.g. Clarida et al., 1999). As a con-
sequence, Ricardian equivalence holds in these models, and government debt policy has
no bearing on aggregate demand and inﬂation (as long as the public sector respects its
solvency constraint1), leaving monetary policy as solely responsible for macroeconomic
stabilization.
Most recently, some studies have focused on the assumption that lump-sum taxes are
unavailable, with the consequence that government debt matters indirectly for output and
inﬂation determination.2 In these models, public debt can have an aggregate supply in
the short run when it is negatively related to tax distortions. In this paper, we take
ad i ﬀerent approach and consider cases where the current stock of government bonds
directly aﬀects the consumption and saving behavior of households, implying that output
and inﬂation are not independent of debt policy in equilibrium. This setup is shown
to imply that equilibrium determination and the model’s responses to shocks crucially
depend on the interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policies, since the former controls the
price and the latter the supply of government bonds, through which both impact on
aggregate demand. Under non-neutrality the evolution of public debt introduces history
dependence of equilibrium sequences, which steers expectations about future prices and
real activity, implying that high shares of tax ﬁnance and, in particular, balanced budget
policies are — under anti-inﬂationary monetary policy regimes — recommendable for short-
run macroeconomic stabilization.
Speciﬁcally, while inﬁnite horizons, lump-sum taxation, and ﬁscal solvency are as-
sumed throughout, aggregate demand eﬀects of public debt are introduced through either
1For deviations from this principle, see e.g.Leeper (1991), Woodford (2001a), or Benhabib et al. (2001),
who analyze so-called ‘non-Ricardian’ ﬁscal policy regimes. An alternative strategy that gives rise to debt
eﬀects is applied in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), where policy interactions originate in a Blanchard
(1985)-type speciﬁcation of ﬁnite horizons.
2See Benigno and Woodford (2003) Kollmann (2004), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) for the
analysis of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in models with distortionary taxation and sticky prices.
1of two speciﬁcations which both imply short-run non-neutrality of public debt. We isolate
a mechanism by which the total rate of return on government bonds decreases with the
real value of its outstanding stock. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is due to Canzoneri and Diba
(2004), who propose to resolve price level indeterminacy under interest rate policy by al-
lowing public debt to provide transaction services. This property is modeled in this paper
by assuming transaction costs to be decreasing and convex in both types of government
liabilities, money and bonds. The total rate of return on bonds, therefore, consists of in-
terest rate payments and of a real return from lowering transaction costs. As the marginal
return from transaction services is decreasing in households’ government bond holdings,
real public debt is negatively related to its rate of return. Thus, an increase in public
debt (ceteris paribus) induces substitution of consumption from the future to the present.
This intertemporal substitution mechanism is the speciﬁc form in which government debt
inﬂuences aggregate demand in this model. Alternatively, a second assumption, which es-
tablishes an equivalent link between current consumption and real debt, is that the ﬁscal
authority repays only a fraction of debt obligations in each period. The aforementioned
intertemporal substitution eﬀect then also emerges when this fraction decreases with the
current stock of public debt, which can be interpreted as an ad-hoc speciﬁcation of a
sovereign default probability.3
We embed these assumptions in a New Keynesian sticky price model, where the two
alternative assumptions mentioned above lead to identical structures.4 Fiscal and mone-
tary policies are speciﬁed in form of simple feedback rules, which is convenient as it allows
for a straightforward identiﬁcation of their eﬀects on macroeconomic stability. The ﬁscal
authority is assumed to levy lump-sum taxes as a percentage of its expenditures, while
the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on current inﬂation.
The following results are derived. First, due to the link between aggregate demand and
government debt, the existence of a stable steady state requires the equilibrium sequence
of real government bonds to be stationary. This is guaranteed as long as there is a negative
feedback from inﬂation to the real value of the stock of outstanding debt, which is the
case when the nominal interest rate policy of the central bank is not too aggressively
targeting inﬂation. Given this, any decline in real public debt tends to reduce aggregate
demand (by one of the two mechanisms introduced above) and thus inﬂation, which in turn
causes debt to recover. This also rules out the possibility of local equilibrium multiplicity
that is known to characterize many models with nominal interest rate policy: Arbitrary
expectations of higher inﬂation would raise the expectation of future decreases in the real
value of government bonds, and thus of a higher rate of return, inducing current demand
3Arbitrage freeness then demands the interest rate on government bonds to exceed a risk-free interest
rate by a (risk) premium. For a thorough analysis of sovereign default risk in a general equilibrium
framework, see Uribe (2002).
4Similar relations also arise when households face convex adjustment costs for bond holdings, as assumed
in ”limited participation” models (see, e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992), or in an overlapping
generations framework (see Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000). The latter approach, however, diﬀers from our
speciﬁcation in that public debt is there also non-neutral in the long-run.
2a n dp r i c e st os l u m p ,s u c ht h a ti n ﬂation expectations cannot be self-fulﬁlling. Hence, if
public debt matters for aggregate demand, monetary policy is relieved from the task of
avoiding sunspot equilibria, which is in contrast to the results obtained in corresponding
models with neutral debt (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003).
Second, we derive the impulse responses of the model’s reactions to interest rate and
tax shocks. The model behaves intuitively and in accordance with empirical evidence, in
that an unexpected increase in the nominal interest rate and a temporary rise in taxes
are contractionary, i.e. cause output and inﬂation to decline (see Christiano et al., 1999,
Mountford and Uhlig, 2002). However, a high degree of debt ﬁnancing can counteract the
eﬀect of an interest rate increase, and a very aggressive monetary policy can overturn the
impact of higher taxes. The reason is that in both cases there are large increases in public
debt which tend to raise output due to the intertemporal substitution eﬀect.
Third, we analyze the contributions of monetary and ﬁscal policy to stabilizing ﬂuc-
tuations induced by cost-push shocks, which lead to an immediate rise in inﬂation, and a
decline in output and public debt. A more aggressive interest rate setting reduces (raises)
inﬂation (output) ﬂuctuations, as would also be the case in a corresponding model with
neutral debt. The new element here is, however, that a high degree of tax ﬁnancing always
reduces the inﬂation variance, while it may raise or reduce the output variance depend-
ing on the monetary stance. The reason is that a rise in inﬂation due to a cost-push
shock tends to lower the real value of public debt, which reinforces via the intertemporal
substitution channel the output contraction. When this channel is more pronounced, the
inﬂation variance declines, while the output variance rises for moderate interest rate poli-
cies. This, however, changes under aggressive anti-inﬂationary monetary policy regimes,
where higher shares of tax ﬁnancing also reduce output ﬂuctuations. We further ﬁnd that
with tight debt control, and in particular under a balanced budget regime, both the vari-
ance of output and of inﬂation can be lower in the present model than in a standard New
Keynesian model, where, other things equal, public debt is neutral.
The reason why tight constraints on public debt contribute to macroeconomic stabi-
lization under debt non-neutrality (as indicated by the ﬁrst and the third result) is that
the ﬂuctuations of inﬂation are limited by the requirement that the equilibrium sequence
of real government debt must be stationary. Thus, ﬁscal policy induces the equilibrium
sequences of inﬂation and output to evolve in a history dependent way. This constitutes
an evident analogy to the role of monetary policy in the debt neutral case, where the opti-
mal commitment solution is known to minimize macroeconomic ﬂuctuations by inducing
history dependence (see Woodford, 2003).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the uniqueness and stability of the steady state, whereupon section 4 derives the
model’s behavior under shocks and analyzes output and inﬂation volatility under cost-push
shocks. Section 5 concludes.
32 A sticky price model with non-neutral debt
In this section a model in which the stock of government bonds aﬀects its total rate
of return is presented. We separately provide two alternative modelling strategies to
introduce this feedback mechanism into an otherwise conventional New Keynesian sticky-
price model. First, government bonds are — analogously to money — an argument of
a convex transaction cost function. Since the model becomes non-linear in public debt
through this assumption, the households’ savings/consumption decision is related to their
holdings of government bonds. Second, the ﬁscal authority is assumed to repay only a
fraction of its debt obligations, and the size of the fraction is assumed to be decreasing in
the total amount of outstanding debt.
2.1 Version A: Transaction services of bonds
Throughout the paper, nominal variables are denoted by upper-case letters, while real
variables are denoted by lower-case letters. A bar over a variable denotes a constant
steady state value, and a caret operator marks a logarithmic deviation from steady state,
b xt =l o g ( xt/x). There is a continuum of households indexed with j ∈ [0,1]. Households
have identical asset endowments and identical preferences. Household j maximizes the





where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set, and
β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility u is assumed to be
increasing in consumption c, decreasing in working time l,s t r i c t l yc o n c a v e ,t w i c ec o n t i n -
uously diﬀerentiable, and to satisfy the usual Inada conditions. For analytical simplicity,
instantaneous utility u is further restricted to be separable in private consumption c and
working time l : u(cjt,l jt)=υ(cjt) − µ(ljt).
At the beginning of period t household j is endowed with holdings of money Mjt−1,
government bonds Bjt−1, which are carried over from the previous period, and a portfolio
of state contingent claims on other households yielding a (random) payment Zjt.L e t
qt,t+1 denote the period t price of one unit of currency in a particular state of period t+1
normalized by the probability of occurrence of that state, conditional on the information
available in period t. Then, the price of a random payoﬀ Zjt+1 in period t+1is given by
Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1].
Purchases of the consumption good are assumed to be associated with real transaction
costs. While it is commonly assumed that only money provides transaction services, here
also holdings of government bonds reduce transaction costs. We view this assumption,
which is, for example, also applied Bansal and Coleman (1996), Lahiri and Vegh (2003),
and, particularly, in Canzoneri and Diba (2004) for a related purpose, as reasonable,
since securities serve as collateral for many types of transactions. Our speciﬁcation of
4transaction costs h further implies that private debt, which can be freely issued by the
households, is diﬀerent, as it does not provide transaction services. This assumption can
for example be rationalized by the asset acquisition policy of many central banks, by which
public debt but not private debt is eligible in open market operations (see Lacker, 1997).
We assume that the goods market opens before the asset market, such that households
rely on the beginning-of-period holdings of government liabilities to reduce transaction
costs.5
Assumption 1 The transaction cost function h(cjt,M jt−1/Pt,B jt−1/Pt) satisﬁes: i)
h is non-negative, increasing in c,d e c r e a s i n gi nMjt−1/Pt and in Bjt−1/Pt,a n dt w i c e
continuously diﬀerentiable in all arguments, ii) hcc ≥ 0,h mm > 0,h bb > 0, limm→0 hm =
−∞, limb→0 hb = −∞, and iii) hcm = hcb (= hmb)=0 .
Part iii) implies that the transaction cost function is separable in all arguments (as in
Lahiri and Vegh, 2003). We further assume that transaction costs are private costs that
are paid to a particular sector whose only function is to rebate its receipts immediately
to the household sector through lump-sum transfers, such that transaction costs do not
show up in the aggregate resource constraint. Both assumptions ensure that there is no
direct (wealth) eﬀect of money and bond holdings on consumption. Nonetheless, there is
an eﬀect of government bond holdings on consumption that operates exclusively through
intertemporal substitution, which will be explained below.
In order to introduce supply side disturbances, we assume that households monopolis-
tically supply diﬀerentiated labor services. Diﬀerentiated labor services lj are transformed
into aggregate labor input lt,w h i c hc a nb ee m p l o y e df o rt h ep r o d u c t i o no ft h eﬁnal good.






jt dj.T h ee l a s t i c i t y
of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor services ϑt > 1 varies exogenously over time.












where wjt and wt are the individual and the aggregate real wage rate, respectively. House-
hold j faces a lump-sum tax Ptτt (where P is the aggregate price level), labor income
Ptwjtljt and dividends Dj,it from monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
After the goods market is closed, the ﬁnancial market opens where households can either
invest in nominal bonds Bjt at the price 1/Rt,i nm o n e yh o l d i n g sMjt, or in nominal state
contingent claims. Household j’s ﬂow budget constraint reads
Mjt + Bjt/Rt + Et [qt,t+1Zjt+1]+Ptcjt + Pth(cjt,M jt−1/Pt,B jt−1/Pt) (3)




5Note that the partial derivative of h with respect to the real value of beginning-of-period t money
(bond) holdings Mjt−1/Pt (Bjt−1/Pt) is denoted by hm (hb).
5It maximizes (1) subject to (2), (3), and a borrowing constraint lims→∞ Etqt,t+s(Mjt+s +
Bjt+s + Zjt+1+s) ≥ 0, for given initial values Mj(−1) = M−1 > 0, Bj(−1) = B−1 > 0,a n d
Zj0 = Z0.T h eﬁrst order conditions for the household’s problem are given by
























= λjt, where λjt is the Lagrange multiplier on the
budget constraint, πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inﬂation rate, mjt ≡ Mjt/Pt and bjt ≡ Bjt/Pt
are real cash and government bond holdings, respectively, and ξt ≡ ϑt/(ϑt−1) denotes the
wage mark-up, which is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process (see below).
Further, the transversality condition lims→∞ Etqt,t+s(Mjt+s + Bjt+s + Zjt+1+s)=0is
required to hold.
Equations (4) and (5) are ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and labor supply. The
central model element can be seen in equation (6), which is the ﬁrst order condition for
bond holdings. Here, the growth rate of the shadow price of wealth λjt is related to the
expected total rate of return on government bonds (given in the square brackets), consist-





. By the assumption hbb > 0 the latter is decreasing in the stock of real
bonds. Thus, a higher stock of bonds reduces its rate of return, which triggers the same
intertemporal reallocation of consumption as a real interest rate reduction, since it requires
the growth rate λjt+1/λjt to rise. This relation, which will be called the intertemporal
substitution eﬀect of government debt henceforth, is the basis of the relevance of debt for
aggregate demand.
Equation (7) holds for each state in period t+1 , and determines the price of one unit
of currency for a particular state at time t+1normalized by the conditional probability of
occurrence of that state in units of currency in period t. Since all households face the same
stochastic discount factor qt,t+1, they can completely share consumption risks, i.e., their
growth rates of λjt+1/λjt are identical (see 7). Further, assuming identical initial asset
endowments, it follows that shadow prices equalize across households λjt = λt.B y ( 4 )
and (6), consumption and bond holdings are, therefore, also identical between households.
We thus omit the indices j in what follows, except for the idiosyncratic working time ljt,
which is monopolistically supplied to ﬁrms at a wage rate wjt. The interest rate on a
risk-free portfolio between t and t+1is given by R
f
t ≡ 1/Etqt,t+1. Arbitrage freeness then
implies the risk-free interest rate R
f
t to exceed the interest rate on government bonds Rt,
for strictly positive bond holdings (see 6). It should be noted that the central bank will
be assumed to set Rt, such that R
f
t can be separately determined in equilibrium. This
assumption contains a major departure of the present model from related studies, which
6regularly assume that the central bank sets the nominal rate of return on a one-period
risk-free portfolio, where the stock of assets has no bearing on the rate of return (see
Woodford, 2003). Here, in contrast, by setting the nominal rate on an asset that yields an
additional non-pecuniary beneﬁt through its ability to facilitate transactions, the central
bank’s policy interferes with the supply of public debt, since both jointly aﬀect its total
rate of return by (6).
The ﬁnal consumption good is an aggregate of diﬀerentiated goods produced by mo-
nopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed with i ∈ [0,1]. The CES aggregator of diﬀer-








it di, with ²>1, where yt is the number of
units of the ﬁnal good, yit the amount produced by ﬁrm i,a n d² the constant elastic-
ity of substitution between these diﬀerentiated goods. Let Pit and Pt denote the price
of good i set by ﬁrm i and the price index for the ﬁnal good. The demand for each
diﬀerentiated good is yit =( Pit/Pt)




it di.A ﬁrm i produces
good yi employing a technology which is linear in the labor input: yit = lit (note that
lt =
R 1
0 litdi). Hence, labor demand satisﬁes: mcit = wt,w h e r emc denotes real marginal
costs. Nominal stickiness is present in form of staggered price setting as developed by
Calvo (1983). Each period ﬁrms may reset their prices with the probability 1−φ indepen-
dently of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction φ ∈ [0,1) of ﬁrms are
assumed to adjust their previous period’s prices according to the simple rule Pit = πPit−1,
where π denotes the average inﬂation rate. Firms are assumed to maximize their market
value, which equals the expected sum of discounted dividends Et
P∞
s=0 qt,t+sDit+s,w h e r e
Dit ≡ (Pit − Ptmcit)yit and we assumed that ﬁrms also have access to contingent claims.
In each period a measure 1−φ of randomly selected ﬁrms set new prices e Pit as the solution
to max e Pit Et
P∞
s=0 φsqt,t+s(πs e Pityit+s − Pt+smct+syit+s),s . t . yit+s =( πs e Pit)−²P²
t+syt+s.




















1−² +( 1− φ) e P1−²
t at the steady state for a given initial price level
P−1 > 0 is known to lead to b πt = χc mct + βEtb πt+1,w i t hφχ =( 1− φ)(1 − βφ), while
aggregate output is given by yt =( P∗










¢−² +( 1− φ)e P−²
t (see Yun, 1996).
The public sector consists of the ﬁscal authority and the central bank. The ﬁscal
authority issues risk-less one-period bonds Bt at the price 1/Rt paying Bt units of currency
in period t +1 , receives a transfer τc
t from the central bank, and collects lump-sum taxes
τt from households,
Bt−1 = Bt/Rt + Ptτt + Ptτc
t. (9)
7We abstract from any government expenditures on goods, such that the services on out-
standing debt are the only ﬂow that needs to be ﬁnanced, either by issuing new debt or by
raising taxes. To facilitate the isolation of debt eﬀects, we assume that the ﬁscal authority
sets taxes according to a simple feedback rule. In particular, we specify the level of taxes
as a fraction of debt service costs it






where 1+it = Rt. We further assume that κt satisﬁes κt = κexp(εκt), where κ ∈ (0,1]
and εκt is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero. The stochastic feedback parameter κt
thus speciﬁes how actively the government seeks to collect funds from the private sector
to ﬁnance its debt burden. Using (9) and (10), the evolution of government debt can be
summarized by
Bt =( 1+( 1− κt)it)Bt−1. (11)
Note that κt =1is the case of a budget that balances in every instant, such that nominal
government bonds are constant over time: Bt−1 = Bt.T h u s , κt measures the share of
government expenditures that are ﬁnanced through taxation as opposed to debt. It is
crucial to note that this speciﬁcation of tax policy, in particular the property κ > 0,
ensures ﬁscal solvency, lims→∞ Bt+sΠs
v=1R−1
t+v =0 .T h u s ,ﬁscal policy regimes considered
in our analysis are not related to so-called non-Ricardian policy regimes, which are known
to aﬀect equilibrium determination under lump-sum taxes (see Benhabib et al., 2001).
The central bank transfers seigniorage to the ﬁscal authority, Ptτc
t = Mt − Mt−1,a n d
controls the nominal interest rate Rt on government bonds. To minimize the model’s
complexity, we assume that the central bank sets Rt in the most simple way contingent
on current inﬂation, subject to a monetary policy shock,
Rt = R(πt,εrt)=Rπ
ρπ
t exp(εrt), ρπ > 0,R t ≥ 1, (12)
where εrt is assumed to be i.i.d. with mean zero. We further assume the support of all
shocks to be small enough such that there exists a constant R that the central bank chooses
to ensure that Rt ≥ 1 holds for all t. Hence, the nominal interest rate is non-negatively
related to the inﬂation rate through the elasticity ρπ.
Since all households are identical, in the aggregate their asset holdings entirely consist
of government liabilities and the indices for the labor market variables can be omitted.
Further, using that transaction costs are private (yt = ct) and that money is irrelevant for
the determination of the remaining variables, a competitive equilibrium of the model can
be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {yt, lt, πt,P ∗
t ,
Pt, e Pt, mct, wt,b t,R t}∞
t=0 satisfying the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions mct = wt,( 8 )w i t h
e Pit = e Pt,a n dP
1−²
t = φ(πPt−1)
1−² +( 1− φ) e P1−²
t , the households’ ﬁrst order conditions















and πt = Pt/Pt−1, the aggregate resource constraint yt =( P∗







t , and the transversality condition, for ﬁscal and monetary policy
satisfying bt =( 1+( 1−κt)it)bt−1π−1




t=0 and initial values P−1 > 0, P∗
−1 > 0, and b−1 ≡ B−1/P−1 > 0.
As implied by deﬁnition 1, the equilibrium sequence of public debt cannot separately
be determined from the equilibrium sequences of the other variables, which leads to the
failure of Ricardian equivalence. This property is due to the combined assumptions that (i)
the quantity of debt aﬀects the household’s intertemporal consumption decision by hb < 0,
and that (ii) the central bank sets the price of public debt Rt. In contrast, real debt would
be neutral and thus indetermined if either of these assumptions failed, in which case the
equilibrium would be independent of ﬁscal policy (given that the latter is solvent).
2.2 Version B: Partial debt repayment
The non-neutrality of public debt can also be derived from a second approach where we
abstain from assuming that bonds provide transaction services (i.e. set hb =0 ), but
which leads to an equivalent structure through a diﬀerent mechanism. Assume that the
ﬁscal authority only partially repays its debt obligations. Speciﬁcally, only a fraction
1 − δ with δ ∈ (0,1] per unit of public debt is repaid in every period, where δ is an
increasing function of the real value of the beginning of period (aggregate) stock of public
debt δ0(Bt−1/Pt) > 0. This assumption can either be interpreted as a deterministic debt
repayment rule of the ﬁscal authority, which aims at alleviating the households’ tax burden
in states where public indebtedness is high, or as a probability of sovereign default which
rises with the stock of public debt. The latter interpretation, which we view as more
appealing, relates to a modelling strategy applied to induce stationarity of open economy
models by introducing a domestic default probability increasing with foreign debt (see, e.g.,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001). It should, however, be noted that a default probability
interpretation is not literally compatible with our speciﬁcation of public policy, which
ensures government solvency.6 The ﬂow budget constraint of household j is then given by
Mjt + Bjt/Rt + Et [qt,t+1Zjt+1]+Ptcjt + Pth(cjt,M jt−1/Pt)




The ﬁrst order conditions for government bonds changes to λt = RtβEt(λt+1
1−δ(bt/πt+1)
πt+1 ),
w h e r ew eu s e dt h a tλjt = λt. Further, the public sector budget constraint now reads
Ptgt +Mt−1 +(1− δ)Bt−1 = Ptτt +Bt/Rt +Mt.T h eﬁscal authority rebates the savings
6For an endogenous derivation of a probability of sovereign default, see Uribe (2002).




t +δBt−1). As a consequence, public debt again evolves according to (11). A rational
expectations equilibrium is then characterized as in deﬁnition 1, except for equation (13),











In contrast to the former version, the risk free interest rate R
f
t cannot exceed the nominal
interest rate on government bonds Rt. However, the dynamic behavior of the equilibrium
sequences in version A and B are qualitatively identical for bt > 0,s i n c eδ0 > 0 in version
B has the same consequences as hbb > 0 in version A.
3 Steady state and stability
Before turning to the main task of discussing the implications of debt non-neutrality
for macroeconomic stabilization below, we characterize the model’s equilibrium given in
deﬁnition 1 by discussing the conditions that lead to the existence, uniqueness, and local
(saddle point) stability of its steady state.
3.1 Steady state
A deterministic steady state (εrt = εκt =0and ξt = ξ) of the model is characterized by
constant values for output, inﬂation, and government bonds. The latter requirement is the
distinguishing feature here, since under Ricardian equivalence the stock of bonds would
not be constrained by the assumptions needed to guarantee the existence of a steady state.
The steady state of model A can be reduced to a set of conditions relating output,
inﬂation, and real debt. Due to the assumption that transaction costs are private and
separable, the ﬁrst order conditions on consumption and labor, and the aggregate resource
constraint uniquely determine steady state output by
µ0(y)υ0(y)−1(1 + hc(y)) = (ϑ − 1)(² − 1)/(ϑ²), (15)
where bars indicate steady state values of endogenous variables.7 A steady state further
requires bt = b and πt = π (see 11 and 13). The ﬁscal and monetary policy speciﬁcation
leads to the restriction
π =1+( 1− κ)(Rπρπ − 1), (16)
on the steady state inﬂation rate. Whether condition (16) has a unique or multiple so-
lutions for the steady state inﬂation rate depends on both policy parameters. The equi-
librium condition for bond holdings (13) for version A can be used to uniquely determine
7In contrast, steady state output is in general not independent of real wealth (debt) in a ﬁnite horizon
set-up (see, e.g., Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000), such that real public debt and, thus, inﬂation aﬀect real
activity also in the long run.
10the steady state level of government bonds for a given steady state inﬂation rate,
hb(b/π)=1− π/[βRπρπ]. (17)
The steady state inﬂation rate and, thus, the steady state level of government bonds, is
determined by (16). As policy satisﬁes κ ∈ (0,1] and R = Rπρπ ≥ 1,w ek n o wt h a t
G(π) ≡ (1 + (1 − κ)(Rπρπ − 1)) − π is strictly positive for π → 0. Hence, G(π)=0has
a unique solution if G0(π) < 0 ⇔ ρπ < [
¡
Rπρπ−1¢
(1 − κ)]−1. Using that (17) and hb < 0
imply Rπρπ−1 < 1/β,as u ﬃcient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a steady
state inﬂation rate for version A is given by
ρπ < β/(1 − κ). (18)
If (18) is satisﬁed, the model further exhibits a unique steady state level of government
bonds. For version B, the condition for existence and uniqueness of the steady state is
slightly diﬀerent, as the risk-free interest rate cannot exceed the interest rate on govern-
ment bonds. In particular, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence and
uniqueness of a steady state inﬂation rate for version B is given by ρπ <
β(1−δ)
1−κ ,w h i c hi s
more restrictive than (18).
The existence of a steady state relies on the two eﬀects of inﬂation on public debt.
On the one hand, the real value of nominal debt decreases with inﬂation. On the other
hand, higher inﬂation induces the central bank to raise the nominal interest rate such that
the ﬁscal authority might issue new debt to ﬁnance additional interest rate payments.
If G0(π) < 0, then there exists an inﬂation rate where both eﬀects exactly oﬀset each
other, such that real public debt is constant. If, however, interest rate policy is too
aggressive (high ρπ)f o rag i v e nﬁscal stance κ, or equivalently if the share of tax ﬁnanced
ﬁscal expenditures is too small (low κ) for a given monetary stance ρπ,t h e nG(π) can
be increasing in inﬂation. For b>0, any rise in inﬂation, which causes the central bank
to increase the nominal interest rate and, thus, raises interest payments on outstanding
debt, is followed by an issuance of government bonds that leads to a rise in real public
debt. Thus, the only value for real public debt which remains constant would be zero.
This, however, is not a feasible equilibrium value, since assumptions on the transaction
cost function leads to a strictly positive value of government bond holdings of households.
The properties of the steady state for version A are summarized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 (Steady state) Assume that ﬁscal and monetary policy satisfy (18). Then
a steady state of the model described in deﬁnition 1 exists and is uniquely determined.
It is characterized by i) y>0, π ≥ 1,a n db>0; ii) ∂y/∂κ =0 ,∂π/∂κ < 0, and
∂b/∂κ Q 0 ⇔ ρπ R 1 − Ψ,w h e r eΨ ≡ hbb
1−hb
b
π > 0;a n diii) ∂y/∂ρπ =0 ,∂π/∂ρπ > 0, and
∂b/∂ρπ R 0 ⇔ ρπ R 1 − (Ψ + Υ),w h e r eΥ ≡
π(1+lnπ)
∂π/∂ρπ > 0.
Proof. The steady state condition (15) determines y independently of the policy pa-
11rameters, such that ∂y/∂κ = ∂y/∂ρπ =0 . Condition (16) implies that ∂π/∂κ =( R −
1)/G0(π) < 0 and ∂π/∂ρπ = −[(1−κ)Rlnπ]/G0(π) > 0, given that (18) ensures G0(π) < 0.













R 0 ⇔ hbb
1−hb
b
π R (1 − ρπ), we can conclude




¢−1 [π(1 + lnπ) − (1 − ρπ)(∂π/∂ρπ)] R 0 ⇔ ρπ R 1 − (Ψ + Υ).
Output and (equivalently) consumption are not aﬀected by monetary or ﬁscal policy mea-
sures in the steady state. Assuming that (18) is satisﬁed, steady state inﬂation unambigu-
ously rises with the reactiveness of monetary policy and declines with a permanent rise
in the ﬁscal policy parameter κ governing the proportion of tax ﬁnancing. The eﬀects on
public debt are not unambiguous. A rise in κ leads to a decline in real public debt if and
only if the inﬂation elasticity of the interest rate rule is suﬃciently aggressive, ρπ > 1−Ψ.
The latter has a further (direct) impact on public debt via (17), making real public debt
increase with ρπ for ρπ > 1−(Ψ + Υ). It should be noted that the results summarized in
proposition 1 also apply for version B,w h e r eρπ <
β(1−δ)
1−κ replaces condition (18) and the




Summing up, while the ﬁscal authority can reduce nominal debt by raising the share
of tax ﬁnancing (see 11), its inﬂuence on the real value of outstanding debt crucially relies
on the reaction of inﬂation and thus on the stance of monetary policy. Note that in the
balanced budget case κ =1 , from (16) steady state inﬂation is π =1 .
3.2 Local dynamics
Next, we turn to the analysis of the local dynamics in the neighborhood of a steady
state (assuming φ > 0). The purpose is to ﬁnd the conditions under which the rational
expectations equilibrium path is locally unique and stable, such that the steady state is a
saddle point. A crucial feature of the model is the relevance of real debt as a predetermined
state variable, which evolves in a history dependent way. Since the evolution of this state
variable is aﬀected by the realizations of inﬂation, the requirement that all equilibrium
sequences have to be stable imposes a restriction on current and future inﬂation — which
would not appear in an equilibrium under debt neutrality. As a consequence, the model
under debt non-neutrality appears to behave in a fundamentally diﬀerent way compared to
the latter, regardless of the magnitude of the partial eﬀect of debt on output growth, which
is measured by the elasticity Ψ. In particular, the history dependence steers future inﬂation
expectations and leads to a condition for stability and uniqueness of local equilibria, i.e., for
a saddle path conﬁguration, that is not related to the Taylor-principle that characterizes
otherwise comparable models with debt neutrality (see Woodford, 2001b).
Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions given in deﬁnition 1 at the steady state,
which is characterized in proposition 1, leads to the following set of approximate equilib-
12rium conditions in b yt, b πt, b bt,a n db Rt:
σb yt =σEtb yt+1 − b Rt +( 1− Ψ)Etb πt+1 + Ψb bt, Ψ > 0, (19)
b πt =βEtb πt+1 + ωb yt + b ϕt, (20)
b bt =b bt−1 + η b Rt − b πt − εκt, η ∈ [0,1) and ∂η/∂κ < 0, (21)
b Rt =ρπb πt + εrt, (22)
together with an exogenous stochastic process for the cost-push shock assumed to follow
b ϕt ≡ χb ξt = ρcb ϕt−1 + εct, with ρc ∈ (0,1),w h e r eεct is a white noise innovation, and
σ ≡− uccc
uc + hccc
1+hc > 0, ω ≡ χ(σ + ulll
ul ) > 0, η ≡
(1−κ)R
1+(1−κ)(R−1), given sequences for εκt,
εrt,a n dεct. Recall that Ψ ≡ hbb
1−hb
b
π > 0 in version A and Ψ ≡ δ0
1−δ
b
π > 0 in version B.
Equation (19) speciﬁes the evolution of real aggregate demand as a function of the nominal
interest rate and inﬂation. If debt were neutral, consumption growth would only depend
on the real interest rate; crucially, this is diﬀerent here as real debt b bt enters the demand
equation. Equation (21) is the law of motion of real debt, i.e. the log-linearized ﬂow budget
constraint of the composite government sector. Note that the composite parameter η(κ)
is strictly decreasing in κ. Finally, equation (22) gives the log-linearized nominal interest
rate feedback rule of the central bank. The following proposition states the qualitative
local dynamic properties of the model, for a small weight of debt in the aggregate demand
constraint (19), Ψ ≤ 2.
Proposition 2 (Local dynamics) Suppose that there exists a steady state and that Ψ ≤
2. Then, the model’s local approximation (19)-(22) has a unique equilibrium converging
to the steady state if and only if ρπ < 1+ κ
(1−κ)R.








































where Ξ ≡ 1
σ (ρπ − Ψ(ηρπ − 1) + (Ψ − 1)/β). Since there is one predetermined state
variable (b bt−1), while the other two variables can jump, a saddle path conﬁguration ob-
tains if the matrix A has exactly one eigenvalue with modulus smaller than one. The
characteristic polynomial of A reads H(X)=X3 − (σβ)
−1 (σ + ω +2 σβ − Ψω)X2 −
(σβ)
−1 (Ψηωρπ − ω − σβ − ωρπ − 2σ)X − (σβ)
−1 (σ + ωρπ). As the determinant of A
is strictly larger than one, det(A)=−H(0) = (σβ)
−1 (σ + ωρπ) > 1, A exhibits at
least one unstable eigenvalue. Given that H(1) = (σβ)
−1 (1 − ηρπ)Ψω, there is at least
one stable (and positive) eigenvalue lying between zero and one if 1 − ηρπ > 0.A s
H(−1) = ω(σβ)
−1 [Ψ(1 + ηρπ) − 2(1+ρπ) − 4σ
ω (1 + β)],w ek n o wt h a tH(−1) < 0 for
Ψ ≤ 2 and η < 1, and that the third eigenvalue is unstable. Hence, the model exhibits
exactly one stable and positive eigenvalue if and only if 1 − ηρπ > 0 ⇔ ρπ < 1+ κ
(1−κ)R.
13The condition for saddle path stability in proposition 2 departs fundamentally from the
one known from the corresponding model with debt neutrality (e.g. Clarida et al., 1999),
where the interest rate policy would have to be active to ensure sadde path stability. Here,
stability requires that the central bank does not raise the nominal interest rate too much
in response to inﬂation, and the precise meaning of what is too much depends on the ﬁscal
parameter κ. Essentially, both policy authorities must ensure that the partial eﬀect of
inﬂation on future debt, ∂b bt/∂b πt = ηρπ −1 (from equations 21 and 22) is negative, which
in rearranged form gives the condition stated in the proposition.
To see why, recall that debt is positively related to demand. Hence, if debt were
temporarily higher than in the steady state, this would tend to raise future inﬂation.
T ob r i n gd e b tb a c kt oi t ss t e a d ys t a t e ,h i g h e ri n ﬂation must reduce the real value of
outstanding bonds. But policy interferes with this stabilization mechanism. If the central
bank raises the nominal interest rate in response to higher inﬂation, this increases the
burden of public debt service costs on the ﬁscal budget, since the government would have
to ﬁnance additional interest payments on existing debt. If κ < 1, not all of this additional
expenditure is ﬁnanced through taxation, but a fraction is covered by issuance of new debt.
Since these add to existing debt holdings, they trigger the intertemporal substitution
eﬀect of real debt: higher real debt reduces the marginal return from transaction services
such that consumption is ceteris paribus shifted to the present. Thus, an aggressive
interest rate policy (high ρπ) can induce the economy to evolve on a divergent path,
unless ρπ < 1+ κ
(1−κ)R ⇔ ∂b bt/∂b πt < 0.
If this condition is fulﬁlled, indeterminacy cannot occur in this model, for arbitrary
expectations of rising inﬂation then imply that future debt is reduced, which tends to lower
demand and, therefore, prices, such that inﬂation expectations cannot be self-fulﬁlling.
Some notable implications of this result are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (1) The model exhibits a unique and saddle point stable steady state if mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy satisfy (18). (2) This is the case if ﬁscal policy runs a balanced
budget in the sense κ =1⇒ Bt = Bt−1, or if (3) monetary policy pegs the nominal
interest rate at an arbitrary constant Rt = R>1.
Part (1) states that the condition for uniqueness of the steady state, ρπ < β/(1−κ) from
(18), is suﬃc i e n tf o rt h es a d d l ep a t hs t a b i l i t yc o n d i t i o nρπ < 1+ κ
(1−κ)R from proposition
2 to hold. Thus, there is local equilibrium determinacy if the steady state is unique. Parts
(2) and (3) of the corollary state that both a balanced budget ﬁscal rule and a nominal
interest rate peg are suﬃcient for a unique and saddle point stable steady state to prevail.
In these cases, the policy interaction vanishes, and stability is ensured by one of the policy
rules alone. If the interest rate is pegged, an inﬂation increase unambiguously reduces the
real interest rate, such that debt emissions by the government decline, and the resulting
demand slump stabilizes inﬂation. If the budget is balanced in nominal terms, it can
be seen from (21) that η =0and thus the evolution of real government debt is driven
by inﬂation alone. Hence, higher than average inﬂation automatically reduces the real
14value of debt, increases (by hbb < 0) the return from transaction services, and induces
postponement of consumption to the future such that inﬂation is kept down.
4 Macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and public debt
In this section the impact of debt non-neutrality on the cyclical behavior of output and
inﬂation under cost-push shocks and the role of policy interactions for macroeconomic
stabilization are discussed. First, however, we brieﬂys u m m a r i z et h em a i ne ﬀects of ﬁscal
and monetary policy measures.
4.1 Shock responses
We derive the responses of core variables to cost-push shocks, b ϕt,a n dt oﬁscal and mon-
e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c k s ,εκt and εrt. The policy shocks are studied to assess if the model
behaves in way compatible with empirical evidence, while cost-push shocks are analyzed
to pave the ground for the discussion of policy trade-oﬀs and the performance of diﬀerently
parameterized rules in the next section. To this end, we derive the state space represen-
tation of the log-linearly approximated model (19) to (22) in the endogenous variables
b bt, b πt,a n db yt, given the state variables b bt−1, εrt, εκt, b ϕt, which immediately delivers the
impulse responses. Throughout this section it is assumed that condition (18) is satisﬁed,
such that there is a unique and saddle point stable steady state and that the fundamental
solution is the unique solution of the model. The model is solved applying the method
of undetermined coeﬃcients. Let δyb ≡ ∂b yt/∂b bt−1, δyr ≡ ∂b yt/∂b εrt, δyκ ≡ ∂b yt/∂b εκt,a n d
δyc ≡ ∂b yt/∂b ϕt be the solution coeﬃcients describing the impact of the state variables
on output (analogous deﬁnitions apply for the solution coeﬃcients with respect to inﬂa-
tion and bonds). The following proposition summarizes the qualitative properties of the
coeﬃcients for small debt elasticities, Ψ < 1.
Proposition 3 (Impulse responses) Suppose that Ψ < 1 and (18) are satisﬁed. Then
1. ∂b bt/∂εκt = δbκ < 0, ∂b πt/∂εκt = δπκ < 0,a n di fρπ < f ρπ : ∂b yt/∂εκt = δyκ < 0,
2. ∂b bt/∂εrt = δbr > 0,a n di fη < e η : ∂b πt/∂εrt = δπr < 0 and ∂b yt/∂εrt = δyr < 0,
3. ∂b bt/∂b ϕt = δbc < 0, ∂b πt/∂b ϕt = δπc > 0 and ∂b yt/∂b ϕt = δyc < 0,
and ∂b bt/∂b bt−1 = δb ∈ (0,1), ∂b πt/∂b bt−1 = δπb > 0, and ∂b yt/∂b bt−1 = δyb > 0, where
f ρπ ≡ (1 − Ψ)/β > 0 and e η ≡
¡
Ψ + ρπ +( 1− δb)
£σ
ω (1 + β − βδb)+1− Ψ
¤¢−1 > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the model generates reasonable results: in response to a tempo-
rary rise in taxes (εκt > 0), public debt and, by the intertemporal substitution eﬀect of
debt, also inﬂation declines (see part 1.). As the central bank reacts to the latter by low-
ering the nominal interest rate, the output response crucially depends on monetary policy
reactiveness. If the central bank is not too aggressive, for which ρπ < f ρπ is suﬃcient,
15the expansionary impact of the decline in the nominal interest rate is dominated by the
contractionary eﬀect of lower debt, such that output decreases.
A contractionary monetary policy shock, i.e. a positive innovation to the nominal
interest rate rule (εrt > 0), raises the interest rate burden on outstanding bonds, which
leads to a future rise in debt. The response of output and inﬂation is generally ambiguous
(see part 2.). The reason is that if a suﬃciently large portion of government expenditures
is tax ﬁnanced (η < e η), then inﬂation and output decline in response to a monetary
contraction. Otherwise, with heavy deﬁcit ﬁnance the implied large rise in public debt
can cause an increase in inﬂation and output due the positive intertemporal substitution
eﬀect of debt on private consumption. Finally, part 3. of the proposition states that a
cost-push shock leads to a decline in output and a rise in inﬂation, while the latter causes
a reduction in real public debt.
Summing up, for monetary and ﬁscal policy feedback rules which do not feature ex-
treme parameter values, in the sense that ρπ is not too high and κ is not too low, the
model’s predictions about responses to interest rate and tax shocks qualitatively accord
to the evidence, based on vector autoregressions, provided by Christiano et al. (1999) for
federal funds rate shocks and by Mountford and Uhlig (2002) for tax cut shocks.
4.2 Output and inﬂation volatility
Having established that the model works in an intuitive and empirically plausible way,
we want to assess the impact of public debt non-neutrality on the cyclical behavior of the
model under cost-push shocks. These are chosen as the only driving force of dynamics since
it is well known that exogenous cost changes imply a trade-oﬀ for monetary policy with
respect to the stabilization of inﬂation and output. The focus here is on the modiﬁcation
that debt non-neutrality and ﬁscal policy brings about in this respect. Thus, for the rest of
the section, the policy innovations are set equal to zero, εrt = εκt =0 , such that the ﬁscal
policy stance is constant κt = κ and the interest rate feedback rule reduces to b Rt = ρπb πt.
To facilitate comparisons with corresponding models where debt is neutral, we restrict
our attention to the case where the eﬀect of public debt on the intertemporal substitution
of consumption is small. When debt is non-neutral, the ﬁscal policy stance is relevant
for the cyclical properties of macroeconomic variables. Thus, the interaction between
ﬁscal and monetary policies aﬀects for the variances of output and inﬂation in our model,
whereas only monetary policy is responsible for macroeconomic ﬂuctuations when debt is
neutral. The distinguishing feature of debt non-neutrality is that the evolution of public
debt has to follow a stationary path, which imposes a restriction on feasible equilibrium
sequences of inﬂation and consumption. This raises the question how macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations are altered due to the relevance of public debt, and if changes in the ﬁscal
stance are — corresponding to changes in the monetary stance — associated with a trade-oﬀ
with regard to the variances of output and inﬂation.
164.2.1 A ﬂexible price example
Before we turn to this question, which will be answered by using numerical methods, we
present a simpliﬁed example, for which one can easily examine how the relevance of public
debt aﬀects macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. In order to facilitate the derivation of analytical
results, we apply the ﬂexible price version of the model that is suﬃcient to reveal the main
principle. Thus, we assume that the probability of ﬁrms not receiving a price signal equals
zero φ =0 , such that the equilibrium conditions for the log-linearized version of the model
are given by (19), (21), (22), and the static condition b yt = −(σ+ulll/ul)−1b ξt.P u b l i cd e b t
does, evidently, not aﬀect the equilibrium behavior of output regardless whether debt is
neutral or not. Comparing both versions, it turns out that inﬂation is less volatile under
debt non-neutrality when the cost-push shock is not too strongly autocorrelated. The
following proposition summarizes the particular condition for this result for the example
of an interest rate peg.
Proposition 4 (Variances under φ =0 ) Suppose that prices are ﬂexible and that the
central bank pegs the nominal interest rate ρπ =0 . Then the inﬂation variance is smaller
under debt non-neutrality if ρ−1
c > −Ψ +1+
√
2.
Proof. Under an interest rate peg and ﬂexible prices, the model with Ψ > 0 can be re-
duced to the following system of equations in inﬂation and real public debt: −γ (1 − ρ)b ξt =
(1 − Ψ)Etb πt+1 + Ψb bt and b bt = b bt−1 − b πt, where γ = σ(σ + ulll/ul)−1 > 0. Applying the
method of undetermined coeﬃcients for a generic solution form featuring real public debt
as a state variable b bt = δbb bt−1 + δbeb ξt and b πt = δπbb bt−1 + δπeb ξt, leads to the following
fundamental solution δb =0 , δπb =1 , δbe = −δπe and δπe = γ (1 − ρc)/(1 − ρc + Ψρc),
a n dt oa ni n ﬂation variance satisfying varπ =2 δ2
πevarξ. When debt is neutral (Ψ =0 )t h e
solution for inﬂation reads δπe = −γ (1 − ρc)/ρc, and its variance is varπ = δ2
πevarξ.






c > −Ψ +1+
√
2.
This demonstrates that for the ﬂexible price case with an interest peg, the relevance of
public debt may cause inﬂation to exhibit a smaller variance. The reason for this is that
a stable rational expectations equilibrium path must — under debt non-neutrality — be
associated with a stationary sequence of real public debt, which requires a sequence of
inﬂation that induces the latter (state) variable to evolve on a mean reverting path. To
see this, consider, ﬁrst, a cost increasing shock for the case where debt is neutral. This
leads to an immediate decline in output, which has to be accompanied by a rise in the
real rate of return from government bonds and, thus, by a decline in expected future
inﬂation. Under debt non-neutrality this cannot be an equilibrium outcome, as a decline
in inﬂation would tend to raise real public debt that, on the other hand, would tend to
lower the total real marginal return from bond holdings and would therefore even amplify
the increase in expected future inﬂation (see 19). Thus, stationarity requires a positive and
mild inﬂation response, such that real public debt can decline in a way that is consistent
17with the expected rise in future inﬂation. Once the cost-push shock has died out, inﬂation
h a s ,b y( 1 9 ) ,t ob el o w e rt h a ni nt h es t e a d ys t a t e ,i n d u c i n gt h er e a lv a l u eo fp u b l i cd e b t
to converge back to its steady state value. Thus, debt non-neutrality induces a history
dependence by which inﬂation depends on the real value of beginning-of-period debt. This
is responsible for a reduction of the inﬂation variance if the autocorrelation of cost-push
shocks is suﬃciently small, ρ−1
c > −Ψ+1+
√
2. Otherwise, the recovery of real debt and,
thus, of inﬂation are temporally extended in a way that causes its variances to be higher
than in the case where debt is neutral.
4.2.2 Numerical results
We return to the sticky-price case in this section and investigate the role of government
debt for macroeconomic ﬂuctuations by means of calculating variances for empirically plau-
sible parameter values. The impact of diﬀerent (ﬁscal and monetary) policy parameters
on macroeconomic volatility is assessed by comparing the variances of output and inﬂation
relative to the variance of their source, i.e., the cost-push shock process ϕt.U s i n gt h ec o e f -
ﬁcients of the model’s solution discussed in proposition 3 (see the proof to proposition 3 for
the exact deﬁnitions), the variances of the model’s endogenous variables output (vary), in-
ﬂation (varπ) and government debt (varb) can easily be expressed in relation to the exoge-
nous variance of the cost-push shock, varϕ =( 1 −ρ2
c)−1varεc, where varεc is the variance of




























For convenience, we present the results in graphical form applying a set of deep pa-
rameters in accordance with values often found in the literature. In particular, we set
preference parameters equal to σ = ϑ =2and β =0 .99, the average (quarterly) gross
nominal interest rate to R =1 .01, the autocorrelation of cost-push shocks to ρc =0 .9,a n d
the fraction of non-optimally price adjusting ﬁrms to φ =0 .8, where the latter value ac-
cords to estimates in Galí and Gertler (1999). Since the empirical evidence on the interest
rate and aggregate demand eﬀects of debt is quantitatively inconclusive (see Engen and
Hubbard, 2004), we set the transaction cost elasticity equal to Ψ =0 .05 for the benchmark
speciﬁcation. To assess the impact of this value on the variances of inﬂation and output, a
sensitivity analysis with respect to its inﬂuence is presented in the last part of this section.
These parameter values are then applied to compute the solution coeﬃcients δb, δbc, δπb,
δπc, δyb,a n dδyc for varying policy parameters ρπ and κ.
Figure 1 displays the relative variance of inﬂation varπ/varϕ,a n dﬁgure 2 the relative
variance of output vary/varϕ , each for various values of the ﬁscal feedback parameter κ
and the inﬂation elasticity ρπ of the nominal interest rate on government bonds. Evidently,
the interest rate policy parameter ρπ involves the usual policy trade-oﬀ when the model
is driven by cost-push shocks, in that higher values of ρπ lower the variance of inﬂation,
but increase the variance of output. What is new here is the inﬂuence of the ﬁscal policy
parameter κ:ah i g h e rv a l u eo fκ, i.e. a higher share of tax ﬁnancing, reduces changes
in public debt and is generally associated with a lower inﬂation variance, while it has an
18Figure 1: Relative inﬂation variance.
ambiguous (but generally small) inﬂuence on the output variance. The lowest inﬂation
volatility is achieved with a balanced budget policy.
Before turning to explanations, it is useful to compare the performance of diﬀerent sta-
bilization policies to the case where debt is neutral. Therefore, ﬁgure 3 shows the relative
output and inﬂation variances for selected monetary and varying ﬁscal policy parameters
in comparison to the latter case, which is labelled DN (for debt neutral).8 Recall that
t h eD Nm o d e l ,w h i c hc a nb es u m m a r i z e db y( 2 2 ) ,σb yt = σEtb yt+1 − ρπ b Rt + Etb πt+1,a n d
b πt = βEtb πt+1 + ωb yt + b ϕt, accords to the prototype New Keynesian model by Clarida et
al. (1999). Given that public debt is irrelevant in this model, the fundamental solution
exhibits no endogenous state variable and is characterized by the following coeﬃcients
on cost-push shocks: e δyc = −
ρπ−ρc
ω(ρπ−ρc)+(1−βρc)(1−ρc)σ and e δπc =
σ(1−ρc)
ω(ρπ−ρc)+(1−βρc)(1−ρc)σ.
T h er e l a t i v eo u t p u ta n di n ﬂation variances, which are given by vary/varϕ = e δ
2
yc and
varπ/varϕ = e δ
2
πc, are displayed for ρπ =1 .5 by the solid horizontal lines in ﬁgure 3.
Figure 3 further displays relative variances of the model with non-neutral debt for
three diﬀerent values of the monetary policy feedback parameter, ρπ ∈ {1.25, 1.5, 1.75},
which ensure a commovement of the nominal and the real interest rate (only points where
the parameter combination entail a saddle path stability are shown). Not surprisingly,
higher ρπ values reduce the inﬂation variance and raise the output variance; this eﬀect
8In this case, Ψ =0 , steady state inﬂation is determined by π = Rβ and is, thus, independent of ﬁscal
policy.
19Figure 2: Relative output variance.
is already well known from the DN case. What is new here is seen by comparing the
solid lines in ﬁgure 3. These show that for a given monetary policy stance, in this case
for the example value ρπ =1 .5 common to both solid lines, the variances of both output
and inﬂation are lower for Ψ > 0 ( s o l i dl i n em a r k e dw i t hs q u a r e s )t h a ni nt h eD Nc a s e
(solid line without squares) if the share of tax ﬁnancing κ is suﬃciently high. Thus, the
relevance of government debt for demand determination appears to stabilize inﬂation and
output ﬂuctuations when tax policy contributes to a relatively smooth evolution of real
debt (through a high κ value). The reason is that if a cost-push shock hits the economy,
output declines while inﬂation rises. As has been shown above, the inﬂation increase
reduces the real value of public debt (despite the positive partial eﬀect from a higher real
interest rate). The debt reduction exerts a negative intertemporal substitution eﬀect on
consumption, which tends to exacerbate the output contraction and to mitigate the rise
in inﬂation caused by cost-push shocks. In equilibrium, the dampening eﬀect on (future)
inﬂation is strong enough to limit the real interest rate increase so much that, in the end,
the output variance can be even lower than in the DN case.
This mechanism corresponds to the one outlined for the ﬂexible price case in propo-
sition 4 for an interest rate peg in the presence of price ﬂexibility. As there, the central
point here is that if government debt is relevant for the determination of the equilibrium
values of inﬂation and output, the equilibrium response of inﬂation is constrained by the
requirement that real debt must return to its steady state value subsequent to a shock.
With an active monetary policy, this implies that during the adjustment process future
20Figure 3: Relative inﬂation and output variances, comparison to debt neutral (DN) case.
real rates of interest must be lower than in steady state, which — with a large enough
value for ρπ — also reduces the impact of the shock on consumption and thus can mitigate
output volatility. Thus, the history dependence of the equilibrium sequences introduced
by ﬁscal policy can smooth ﬂuctuations, which in the sticky-price case discussed here also
holds for high shock autocorrelations. This result is related to the well-known principle for
optimal monetary policy in the debt neutral case, where a monetary policy must be history
dependent to implement the fully optimal allocation under commitment (see Woodford,
2003).
Figure 3 further shows that the inﬂation variance is always declining in the tax ﬁnanc-
ing share κ, while the output variance is ambiguously linked to κ f o ral o w e ri n ﬂation
elasticity of the interest rate rule, ρπ =1 .25. In fact, the inﬂation variance reaches a min-
imum in the balanced budget case κ =1 . The reason is that with a nominally balanced
budget the negative inﬂuence of inﬂa t i o no nt h er e a lv a l u eo fd e b ti ss t r o n g e s t ,a n dt h e
mechanism described above is maximal. The eﬀects on the output variance are ambiguous,
since debt reduction on the one hand reduces output partially, but the resulting inﬂation
decrease makes room for lower real interest rates. Given an aggressive monetary policy
(high ρπ), however, there is no trade-oﬀ involved in ﬁscal policy: both the output and
inﬂation variance decrease in κ and are minimized by a balanced budget policy (κ =1 ).9
Finally, ﬁgure 4 shows the same numerical experiment for diﬀerent values of the co-
9It should noted that the latter ﬁscal policy regime further minimizes the average distortion from the
nominal rigidity as it implies the aggregate price level to be constant in the steady state, π = 1.
21eﬃcient Ψ which parameterizes the aggregate demand eﬀect of public debt, assuming a
monetary policy coeﬃcient of ρπ =1 .5. As Figure 4 reveals, the attenuation of the inﬂa-
tion variance attributable to the non-neutrality of debt is stronger when the intertemporal
substitution eﬀect of debt is quantitatively more pronounced, i.e. with higher Ψ.T h e
eﬀect on the output variance is ambiguous. When the share of tax ﬁnancing is small, the
output variance can even rise with the elasticity as demonstrated for κ =0 .4. Provided
that the government ﬁnances a suﬃciently large share of its outlays through taxation, the
output and inﬂation variances are lower than in the corresponding debt neutral case.
Figure 4: Inﬂuence of Ψ on relative output and inﬂation variances (ρπ =1 .5).
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has explored the consequences of public debt non-neutrality for the short-run
dynamics of a sticky-price business cycle model, and examined the interaction of ﬁscal and
monetary policy. Government debt matters for aggregate demand determination through
assumptions that imply the (negative) dependence of the rate of return on government
bonds on the real value of their outstanding stock. This is the case, e.g., if government
bonds yield transactions services, or if higher debt leads to lower repayment ratios. In
both cases, a rise in public debt leads to a decline in the total rate of return, exerting an
expansionary intertemporal substitution eﬀect on (consumption) demand, thus implying a
tendency for rising inﬂation. There is ﬁscal-monetary policy interaction, in that the central
bank’s interest rate reaction to changes in inﬂation inﬂuences the amount of payments on
existing debt that the government has to ﬁnance. The composition of government ﬁnance
22among taxation and debt issuance in turn feeds back on the equilibrium values of output
and inﬂation.
I ti ss h o w nt h a te v e ns m a l le ﬀects of public debt on consumption growth can lead
to results which substantially depart from those known for comparable business cycle
models with neutral debt. Non-neutrality of debt implies that the equilibrium sequence
of real bonds must be stationary, which constrains the admissible equilibrium solutions of
inﬂation. This implies that the central bank’s reaction to inﬂation must not be too large if
the steady state is to be unique and saddle point stable, or the tax ﬁnancing share used by
the government may not be too low. Otherwise, if the expansionary impact of higher debt
were associated with aggressive interest rate increases, the resulting surge in debt service
costs would require the government to issue more debt, which might cause equilibrium
sequences to become divergent. However, a balanced budget ﬁscal policy that keeps the
nominal stock of bonds constant inevitably leads to equilibrium uniqueness and stability,
since higher inﬂation then reduces the real value of debt irrespective of the monetary
policy stance.
Further, while policy eﬀects are generally in accordance with empirical evidence, debt
non-neutrality is found to have an impact on the performance of simple policy rules in
stabilizing the inﬂation and output volatility arising from cost-push shocks. The well
known trade-oﬀ that these impart on monetary policy, which can only lower inﬂation
variance at the cost of augmenting output variance, is existent here as well. Whether
ﬁs c a lp o l i c ya l s of a c e sat r a d e - o ﬀ depends on the monetary policy stance. For an aggressive
anti-inﬂationary monetary policy regime, inﬂation and output variances are simultaneously
minimized for high shares of tax ﬁnance and, in particular, for a balanced budget regime.
Inﬂation and output variances can even be lower than in the debt neutrality case, as the
relevance of public debt imposes a restriction on admissible equilibrium values, introducing
a history dependence in an otherwise forward looking environment. Thus, provided that
public policy is conducted under tight debt constraints, macroeconomic ﬂuctuations can
be reduced by a ﬁscal policy induced history dependence, which relates to the requirement
that a fully optimal monetary policy has to be history dependent in a corresponding
framework where debt is neutral.
Appendix: Proof of proposition 3
To derive qualitative properties of the impulse response of the endogenous variables Xt =
(b bt, b πt, b yt)0 to policy and cost-push shocks, we apply the fundamental solution of the
model which features the state variables St =( b bt−1, εrt, εκt, b ϕt)0.I n w h a t f o l l o w s w e
assume that (18) is satisﬁed, such that the fundamental solution is the unique solution to
(19)-(22). The model is then solved applying the method of undetermined coeﬃcients for





δb δbr δbk δbc
δπb δπr δπk δπc
δyb δyr δπk δπc


 · St = ∆ · St.
Given that (18) is assumed to be satisﬁed, we already know from proposition 2 that
δb ∈ (0,1). Hence, we aim at deriving the solutions for the remaining elements of ∆ as











which are unambiguously positive as (18) ensures ηρπ < 1 ( s e ep r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2 ) .
The coeﬃcients governing the impact responses to the ﬁscal policy shocks (εκt)a r e
δbk =−
ρπω + σ
(1 − ηρπ)Γ + ρπω + σ
∈ (−1,0), δπk = −
Γ
(1 − ηρπ)Γ + ρπω + σ
< 0,
δyk =−
Ψ + δπb(1 − Ψ − ρπβ)+δybσ
(1 − ηρπ)Γ + ρπω + σ
,
where Γ ≡ ω(Ψ + δybσ)+δπb [ω(1 − Ψ)+βσ] > 0. Inspecting the solution for δyk,i m -
mediately reveals that ρπ < (1 − Ψ)/β is suﬃcient for δyk < 0.T h e c o e ﬃcients on the
monetary policy shock (εrt), are given by
δbr =
ω(1 − ηρπ)+( ρπω + σ)η
(1 − ηρπ)Γ + ρπω + σ
> 0, δπr = −
ω − ηΓ





(ω − ηΓ)[δπb(1 − Ψ)+Ψ + δybσ]+βδπb (Γ + σ)
(1 − ηρπ)Γ + ρπω + σ
,
Thus, a low value for η (high κ) satisfying η < e η,w h e r ee η ≡ (Ψ+ρπ+(1 − δb)[σ
ω (1 + β − βδb)+
1 − Ψ])−1 > 0,i ss u ﬃcient to ensure ω − ηΓ > 0 ⇔ δπr < 0 and also guarantees δyr < 0.
Finally, the coeﬃcients on the cost-push shocks (b ϕt) are given by
δbc =−
(1 − ηρπ)(1 − ρc)σ
Θ





ω(ρπ(1 − ηΨ)+1− (δb + ρc)(1 − Ψ)) + σ(1 − δb)(1 − βδb)
ωΘ
< 0,
where Θ ≡− ω[(δb+ρc)(1−Ψ)+ρπ(ηΨ−1)−1]+σ[(1−βρc)(2−δb−ρc)+β(1−δb)2] > 0,
given that 1 < ρπ < 1/η and Ψ < 2. These properties of the solution coeﬃcients are
summarized in the proposition. ¥
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